UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

6-14-2017

State v. Jaskowski Appellant's Brief Dckt. 44772

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"State v. Jaskowski Appellant's Brief Dckt. 44772" (2017). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All. 6757.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/6757

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For
more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
) No. 44772
Plaintiff-Appellant,
)
) Bear Lake County Case No.
v.
) CR-2016-269
)
BRODY L. JASKOWSKI,
)
)
Defendant-Respondent.
)
)
________________________
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
________________________
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF BEAR LAKE
________________________
HONORABLE MITCHELL W. BROWN
District Judge
________________________
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho

BRODY L. JASKOWSKI
109 N. 3rd East
Franklin, Idaho 83237

PAUL R. PANTHER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P. O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534
ATTORNEYS FOR
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT

PRO SE
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................... 1
Nature Of The Case ................................................................................... 1
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings ........................ 1
ISSUE ................................................................................................................... 4
ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................... 5
The District Court’s Conclusion That Jaskowski’s Probation
Conditions Did Not Waive His Right Against Warrantless
Searches Of His Car By His Probation Officer Under The
Facts Of This Case Is Error ........................................................................ 5
A.

Introduction...................................................................................... 5

B.

Standard Of Review ........................................................................ 5

C.

The Search Of His Car Did Not Infringe On Any
Privacy Right Held By Jaskowski During His Probation................... 6

CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................... 9
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ................................................................................. 9

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES

PAGE

Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006) ........................................................... 6
State v. Cruz, 144 Idaho 906, 174 P.3d 876 (Ct. App. 2007) ................................ 6
State v. Gawron, 112 Idaho 841, 736 P.2d 1295 (1987) ....................................... 6
State v. Hedgecock, 147 Idaho 580, 212 P.3d 1010 (Ct. App. 2009)................ 6, 8
State v. Klingler, 143 Idaho 494, 148 P.3d 1240 (2006) ....................................... 6
State v. Pachosa, 160 Idaho 35, 368 P.3d 655 (2016) ......................................... 5
State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207 P.3d 182 (2009) ..................................... 6, 7
State v. Turek, 150 Idaho 745, 250 P.3d 796 (Ct. App. 2011) .................. 5, 6, 7, 8
United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001) ..................................................... 6

ii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
The state appeals from the district court’s order suppressing evidence
found as a result of a probation search.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
A magistrate placed Brody L. Jaskowski on supervised probation for 18
months after his conviction for DUI. (State’s Exhibit 1.) One of the conditions of
probation was:
9. WARRANTLESS SEARCHES: I shall submit and I agree to
polygraph examinations, warrantless searches of my person,
personal property, electronic devices, automobiles, residence, and
outbuildings at the request of my Probation Officer, by the
Probation Officer, Peace Officer, and/or his designee; with or
without Probable Cause; any time day or night. I understand that
any Alcohol, evidence, and/or Contraband will be confiscated, and
new charges can be filed in the event of criminal activity.
(State’s Exhibit 1, p. 3.)
A few days before the expiration of Jaskowski’s probation, a police officer
was looking for him to serve an arrest warrant. (R., p. 156.) Knowing Jaskowski
was on probation, the officer contacted his probation officer. (Id.) The probation
officer also requested that the officer stop Jaskowski. (Id.) The probation officer
requested the stop so he could “see” Jaskowski, whom he had not had personal
contact with for a while, and to “test” him. (R., p. 159.) The officer stopped
Jaskowski while Jaskowski was driving, but learned before making contact with
him that the warrant had been withdrawn. (R., p. 156.) The officer proceeded
with the traffic stop on the basis that the probation officer had also requested the
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officer to stop Jaskowski. (Id.) The officer ultimately cited Jaskowski for failure
to have a current driver’s license. (R., pp. 156-57.)
The probation officer arrived at the scene of the stop, talked to Jaskowski,
and searched his car. (R., p. 157.) The probation officer found a glass pipe with
methamphetamine residue on it. (R., p. 158.) The probation officer requested
that the police officer take Jaskowski into custody and then the probation officer
and the police officer continued the search of Jaskowski’s car and found another
pipe with methamphetamine residue. (R., pp. 157-59.)
The state charged Jaskowski with possession of a controlled substance.
(R., pp. 6-7, 56.) Jaskowski moved to suppress “all evidence seized following
the unconstitutional stop.” (R., pp. 94-95.) In a memorandum in support of the
motion, Jaskowski submitted three issues:
A. Was [Police] Officer Wells and/or [Probation] Officer Harper
authorized to stop Jaskowski’s vehicle based solely upon an
alleged waiver of 4th Amendment Rights and a desire to speak with
Jaskowski?
B. Does the existence of a warrant for arrest and its subsequent
recall form the basis for a permissible traffic stop?
C. Did the state of Idaho adequately meet its burden of proof at the
preliminary hearing with the introduction of a field test conducted by
the officer with no scientific foundation concerning the reliability of
the test?
(R., p. 106.)
The district court concluded that the traffic stop did not violate Jaskowski’s
Fourth Amendment rights because his agreement to submit to warrantless
searches included an implied consent to a limited seizure of his person. (R.,
pp. 161-65.)

It granted the suppression motion, however, based on the
2

conclusion that the search of Jaskowski’s car violated his rights because the
probation officer “did not request permission or consent to search the vehicle.”
(R., pp. 165-67.) The state filed a timely notice of appeal from the order granting
suppression of evidence found in the probation search of Jaskowski’s car. (R.,
pp. 174-76.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court err when it concluded that Jaskowski’s probation
conditions did not allow the search of his car?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court’s Conclusion That Jaskowski’s Probation Conditions Did Not
Waive His Right Against Warrantless Searches Of His Car By His Probation
Officer Under The Facts Of This Case Is Error
A.

Introduction
Concluding that the decision in State v. Turek, 150 Idaho 745, 250 P.3d

796 (Ct. App. 2011), was “controlling,” the district court held the search of
Jaskowski’s car violated his rights against unreasonable searches because the
probation officer “did not request permission or consent to search the vehicle.”
(R., pp. 166-67.) The district court’s decision is in error because it misread the
clear holding in Turek that the probationer must be informed of an officer’s intent
to conduct an impending search pursuant to a probation waiver such as imposed
upon Jaskowski.

The district court’s holding that the probation officer was

required to do more than inform Jaskowski of the impending search, and instead
obtain an independent consent before conducting a proper search, was in no
way required by the holding of Turek, and was reversible error.
B.

Standard Of Review
“When reviewing a motion to suppress, this Court defers to the district

court’s findings of fact unless the findings are clearly erroneous. But this Court
may undertake a free review of the district court’s determination as to whether
constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the facts found.” State
v. Pachosa, 160 Idaho 35, 38, 368 P.3d 655, 658 (2016) (internal quotations
omitted).
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C.

The Search Of His Car Did Not Infringe On Any Privacy Right Held By
Jaskowski During His Probation
Probationers enjoy a reduced expectation of privacy. Samson v.

California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118
(2001); State v. Klingler, 143 Idaho 494, 497, 148 P.3d 1240, 1243 (2006); State
v. Gawron, 112 Idaho 841, 843, 736 P.2d 1295, 1297 (1987); State v. Cruz,
144 Idaho 906, 908, 174 P.3d 876, 878 (Ct. App. 2007). One such reduction in
the expectation of privacy may arise from “an advance waiver of fourth
amendment rights” as a condition of probation.

Gawron, 112 Idaho at 843,

736 P.2d at 1297. See also Knights, 534 U.S. at 118-21 (probation condition
“significantly diminish[ed] Knights’ reasonable expectation of privacy”); Cruz,
144 Idaho at 910, 174 P.3d at 880 (“Cruz’s parole condition significantly
diminished his reasonable expectation of privacy”). The Idaho Supreme Court
“has determined that a probationer’s consent to searches constitutes a waiver of
Fourth Amendment rights.” State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 208, 207 P.3d 182,
184 (2009). “Idaho appellate courts have long recognized that parolees and
probationers have a diminished expectation of privacy and will enforce Fourth
Amendment waivers as a condition of parole or probation.” State v. Hedgecock,
147 Idaho 580, 584, 212 P.3d 1010, 1014 (Ct. App. 2009).
In Turek, the Idaho Court of Appeals applied these legal principles to a
probation search condition similar to the one executed by Jaskowski, and
concluded that it did not constitute “a complete waiver of all Fourth Amendment
rights.” Turek, 150 Idaho at 749, 250 P.3d at 800 (emphasis original). The Court
held that “a probation condition that requires a probationer to submit to a search
6

‘at the request of’ an officer requires that the probationer be informed of an
officer’s intent to conduct an impending search.” Id. at 752, 250 P.3d at 803
(emphasis added). In this case, the probation officer “advised” Jaskowski he was
going to “search the vehicle.” (11/17/16 Tr., p. 7, Ls. 2-14.) Because Jaskowski
was informed of the probation officer’s intent to conduct an impending search,
the search of the car complied with the Fourth Amendment waiver as interpreted
in Turek.
The district court concluded that the search was improper because the
probation officer “did not request permission or consent to search” but instead
made the “declaratory statement” of his intent to search.

(R., p. 167.)

However, under the plain language of the holding of Turek, the Fourth
Amendment waiver at issue merely required that Jaskowski “be informed of an
officer’s intent to conduct an impending search.”

Turek, 150 Idaho at 752,

250 P.3d at 803 (emphasis added). The district court’s requirement that the
probation officer secure “permission or consent to search” on top of the Fourth
Amendment waiver is not required by Turek.
Requiring “permission or consent” in addition to the rights waiver is also
inconsistent with the above-cited law because it would render the Fourth
Amendment waiver a nullity. As set forth above, “a probationer’s consent to
searches constitutes a waiver of Fourth Amendment rights.” Purdum, 147 Idaho
at 208, 207 P.3d at 184. “Idaho appellate courts have long recognized that
parolees and probationers have a diminished expectation of privacy and will
enforce Fourth Amendment waivers as a condition of parole or probation.”
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Hedgecock, 147 Idaho at 584, 212 P.3d at 1014. Interpreting Jaskowski’s Fourth
Amendment waiver as merely allowing a probation officer to request Jaskowski’s
consent to search, something the probation officer could do without a waiver,
renders the waiver a nullity. Compare Turek, 150 Idaho at 749, 250 P.3d at 800
(Fourth Amendment waiver in question is a waiver, albeit not “a complete waiver
of all Fourth Amendment rights” (emphasis

original)).

Moreover, such an

interpretation would make the Fourth Amendment waiver completely redundant
to the first condition of probation requiring compliance with all “lawful requests” of
probation officers and police officers. (Exhibit 1, p. 2.)
The language of probation condition 9 and the holding of Turek show that
Jaskowski entered a waiver, albeit not a “complete” waiver, of Fourth
Amendment rights that reduced his expectation of privacy. Jaskowski was still
entitled to be informed of the intent to search, but he was so informed. The
search in this case did not infringe upon Jaskowski’s reduced expectation of
privacy, and therefore did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The district court
erred in holding otherwise.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court’s
order suppressing evidence and remand for further proceedings.
DATED this 14th day of June, 2017.

__/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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